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INTRODUCTION-LEGAL FRAGMENTATION OF COURTS: USE OF EXTRA-
JUDICIAL DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE A CLASH OF DECISIONS
Courts in common-law countries throughout history have been
aware that they make law and influence commercial practice. They see
their role as extending beyond the adjudication of the particular dispute
1. LLB (Hons), Makerere; Dip LP (LDC); LLM, Ph.D. (Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, Canada; Advocate (Uganda); Professor of Commercial Law; Director,
Centre for Commercial Law, University of Essex. I am ever so grateful to Professor
Benjamin Geva and Osgoode Hall Law School of York University for initiating me into
the exciting world of innovative financial transactions and to the many legal practitioners
and bankers for their generosity with time and knowledge that gives me sustenance. The
law firm of Clifford Chance stands out for specific mention for permitting me to join the
Legal Perspectives seminar programme and generosity with information. The research
assistance of Aysem Diker Vanberg is also gratefully acknowledged.
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between the immediate parties to the guidance of future activity, and
many courts have embraced this task with great responsibility.2 In this
regard, leading courts in the major financial centres make global
commercial law. In some recent litigation concerning international
financial transactions, national courts have been sensitive to the
relevance of other jurisdictions and have expressed a willingness to
3understand what happens in these jurisdictions. This has been a
welcome approach because financial transactions have grown in size and
complexity, and the largest and most spectacular of them all tend to be
cross-border transactions requiring a resolution that is satisfactory across
a number of jurisdictions. In times of economic prosperity, contracting
parties are usually ready to re-negotiate and re-structure contracts rather
than to litigate; such a general approach changes dramatically when there
is the prospect of insolvency of one of the parties or a general economic
downturn in an individual country or a global economic downturn.
In equal measure, courts have for generations endeavoured to learn
and apply what the commercial industry has done in practice in an
endeavour to facilitate commerce, finance and economic prosperity.
Frequently the courts and industry work in tandem in this process of
mutual education and feedback, but sometimes clashes do occur-when
courts overrule a widely held perception of industry practice5 or when the
industry works around court decisions that are considered erroneous.
This article notes the problem of conflicting court decisions that
arise from the fragmentation of the legal landscape while the financial
industry operates on a more or less integrated global basis via a network
of closely linked national and regional financial centres. Additionally,
the article focuses on three recent cases decided in the two leading
financial centres of London and New York in the aftermath of the recent
2. See Power Curber Int'l. v. Bank of Kuwait SA [1981] 1 WLR 1233; Hortico
(Australia) Pty Ltd. v. Energy Equipment Co. Pty Ltd. (1985) 1 NSWLR 545 (Sup. Ct.)
(Austl.).
3. See e.g., Law Debenture Trust Corporation Plc v Concord Trust, [2007] EWHC
2255 (Ch) involving an anti-suit injunction; see also AON Financial Products, Inc v.
Societe Generale 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) (where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a trial decision after ISDA submitted an amicus brief. Joanna Benjamin &
David Rouch, The International Financial Markets as a Source of Global Law: the
Privatisation ofRule-making? 2 L. & FIN. MARKETS REv. 78, 84 n.27 (2008) (the amicus
brief pointed out that "The District Court's errors in this case are of such fundamental
nature that they cast significant doubt on the operation of credit default swap contracts.
The rulings are directly contrary to the settlement mechanics set forth in ISDA's standard
documentation that is used in this $17.1 trillion market.").
4. The best known English judge in this regard might be Lord Mansfield, who was
called "the father of commercial law in this country" in Lickbarrow v. Mason (1787) 2
TR 63, 73 but there are many more judges that have followed that tradition.
5. See, e.g., Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough council [1992]
AC 1 (HL); (appeal taken from Queens Bench).
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global financial crisis ("GFC"). All three cases arose from pre-GFC
transactions that went sour because of the bankruptcy and later collapse
of US investment bank Lehman Brothers. One of the cases pitted the
provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code against those of the International
Swap and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") Master Agreement, one of
the most widely used standard form documents in the world. This case,
6Metavante, is considered one of the most significant decisions
concerning the rights of the parties in over-the-counter derivatives
following a bankruptcy event of default. The significance of this case is
three-fold. First, the decision tested the application the ISDA Master
Agreement in the commercially important jurisdiction of New York.
Second, within the US, the decision triggered a number of cases that
were based on roughly the same facts.! Third, in a global setting the
decision has opened up a debate on some provisions of the ISDA Master
Agreement; one legacy that is certain to remain is the introduction of a
sunset clause, of as yet an indeterminate period, to the non-defaulting
parties' right to make a choice as to what to do following the
counterparty's default. The second and third court cases reviewed in this
article-actually back-to-back cases-consisted of parallel court actions
where the same facts were litigated in London and New York, and the
courts reached conflicting decisions. The cases graphically illustrate the
effect of legal fragmentation because not only do London and New York
share the same common-law background, but both are keenly aware of
the need to avoid conflicting court decisions. The New York decision
was handed down later than its London counterpart, and the New York
judge called for a status conference for resolving the clash between the
two decisions. This aspect of dialogue between and among key
jurisdictions is a feature of lawmaking that has gained momentum and
scope in recent years and has facilitated global financial transactions.
Such dialogue occurs horizontally and involves the courts, industry and
regulators within the same jurisdiction; it also takes place vertically,
progressing from domestic, regional to supranational institutions.' The
institutional authority of the status conference called for by the judge in
6. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 et seq. (JMP) (jointly
administered) (2010).
7. The cases include: LBSF and LBHI v. AIG CDS; The Board of Education of the
City of Chicago v. LBSF and LBHI; and Lehman Brothers Commercial Corporation v
Norton Gold Fields Ltd. See Andrea Pincus, "The Metavante Ruling-In a Case of First
Impression, US Bankruptcy Court Limits ISDA Counterparty Rights Upon a Bankruptcy
Event of Default" Energy Trade and Commodities Alert, Alert 09-303 (Dec. 3, 2009).
8. See Joanna Benjamin & David Rouch, supra note 4; Julia Black & David Rouch,
The Development of the Global Markets as Rule-makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, 2
L. & FIN. MARKETS REv. 218 (2008).
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the US Lehman Brothers case, however, is not clear, and the
enforceability of any decisions would be problematic.
BUSINESS AND LEGAL BACKGROUND-GLOBALIZED FINANCIAL
INDUSTRY CONGLOMERATES OPERATING IN A FRAGMENTED
LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 was a graphic reminder of the
interconnectedness among world economies that resulted from the steady
march of globalisation. It was also a reminder of the ever-present threat
of financial distress and insolvency of institutions, even those that appear
invincible. A most visible aspect of globalisation and recent global
economic prosperity is the global reach of business conglomerates and
none more so than the large banks. Banks and other multinational
businesses operate through complex corporate groups that are interlinked
managerially, operationally, and financially such that a problem that
occurs in one member of the group in one jurisdiction may have a global
reach. One such bank was Lehman Brothers, reputed to have been the
fourth largest US investment bank before its collapse9 and the largest
bankruptcy in history, and whose demise is generally thought to have
triggered the most widespread financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Some spectacular litigation has already resulted from the sequential
filing for bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers Holdings International, Inc.,
the parent company, and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, the
subsidiary, and, on occasion, the issue has been whether the borrower for
bankruptcy purposes was the corporate group, the parent company or the
individual subsidiary. 0 The demise of Lehman Brothers illustrated the
breakneck speed that events can take when trouble brews in some quarter
and the multi-jurisdictional nature of litigation arising from one large
multinational company. It also illustrated that a distressed company or
defaulter need not be poor; indeed the company's overall financial
position could be bad while at the same time some of its contracts or
subsidiaries are "in the money."
Business Features of Cross-Border Transactions
There are a number of business features of cross-border financial
transactions that have led to commensurate developments in the law.
First, the transactions are huge in size and involve a number of financial
institutions. For instance, syndicated loans made to corporate borrowers
9. Other recent problematic companies that collapsed or were on the brink of doing
so include AIG, Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat.
10. This distinction in part explains the different outcomes in the UK case of
Perpetual and the US case of Lehman Brothers, discussed infra.
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in leveraged finance deals are structured to appeal to different lenders' or
investors' appetites for risk in exchange for a higher risk of loss and will
thus be structured in tiers that include senior lenders and subordinated
debt, which takes the form of a first lien or mezzanine. This business
structure is a recipe for conflict because different types of lenders have
different attitudes towards investment. Some take a long-term
perspective while others take a short-term perspective. The approach of
the two groups to a struggling or defaulting borrower can be quite
different, with some lenders prepared to give the borrower some
breathing space to trade out of its difficulties, while other lenders would
prefer to crystallise a loss and enforce security.
Secondly, the large-sized loans entail large credit risk, and lenders
and investors necessarily engage in risk-management products such as
credit derivatives and swaps to hedge against the risk of loss. At the
same time lenders are managing risk, large corporations are also
managing the risks facing them-such as foreign-exchange risk, profit or
interest risk, and commodity risk-thus creating a large and vibrant
market for derivative products." Thus, a prevalent feature of modem
financing is the use of credit default swaps, which are the commonest
financial derivatives used to hedge against the risk of loss by transferring
the risk to another party. The legal nature of credit default swaps
("CDS") was described in AON Financial Products, Inc. v Societe
Generale: 12
Simply put, a credit default swap is a bilateral financial contract in
which a protection buyer makes periodic payments to the protection
seller, in return for a contingent payment if a predefined credit event
occurs in the reference credit. . . . Often the reference asset that the
protection buyer delivers to the protection seller following a credit
event is the instrument that is being hedged.
The court went on to clarify CDSs are different from insurance contracts:
CDS agreements are thus significantly different from insurance
contracts. . . . [T]hey "do not, and are not meant to, indemnify the
buyer of protection against loss. Rather, CDS contracts allow parties
to "hedge" risk by buying and selling risks at different prices and
11. While most derivatives are entered into for speculation and arbitrage, some 10%
are used for actual hedging. For the whole spectrum of derivatives and their
documentation, see SIMoN FIRTH, DERIVATIVES: LAW AND PRACTICE (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2010).
12. AON Financial Products, Inc. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375
F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2004)).
2011] 557
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with varying degrees of correlation." . . . The terms of each credit
swap agreement independently define the risk being transferred.' 3
Credit risk mitigation techniques are part and parcel of modem
investment portfolio management but are also frequently required by the
credit-rating agencies that have become a significant feature of the larger
financial transactions. Where a corporate group is involved, one
technique is the provision of credit enhancement by another member of
the group, say the parent company, which guarantees the obligations of
its subsidiary. Such an arrangement gives the creditor two entities to
look to for the fulfilment of its obligation-the principal debtor and the
credit support provider (guarantor), and, by the terms of most financial
contracts, the default of the guarantor constitutes the default of the
principal debtor as well. Credit-risk mitigation was an important part of
the factual matrix in the Lehman Brothers litigation discussed further
below.
Thirdly, many loans are actually held by institutional investors and
other financial institutions rather than commercial banks, as was
traditionally the case. Such providers of funds include sovereign wealth
funds, private equity, hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and
insurance companies. The non-bank lenders get involved in the loan
either at the outset, i.e. primary syndication level, or at the secondary
level, where they acquire loan interests by way of purchase from the
original lenders. Non-bank lenders have had a tremendous impact on
loan markets. First, they see their involvement in a loan as an investment
that should produce viable returns on its own merit when compared to
other investment instruments, and they will dispose of the loan for
alternative forms of investment if the outlay on the loan is not profitable.
Non-bank lenders are thus unlike commercial banks that are relationship-
driven and tend to hold on to the loan as a market leader in the hope of
ancillary services. To be able to compare the loan with other assets, such
investors demand asset liquidity, transparent pricing and efficient trading
procedures.
The desire of institutional investors to acquire loans and the desire
of banks to sell loans have resulted in many loans being sold off to
international investors through Collateralised Debt Obligations
13. AON Financial Products, Inc. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.
2007). See also Schuyler K Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives: to What Effect
and for Whose Benefit? 8 J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 480 (2009) (discussing further
differences between credit default swaps and insurance contracts include 'pure loss rather
than speculative loss, different common law/legal standards (absence of subrogation,
standards on full disclosure or absence thereof, and different markets and methods of




("CDOs").14 The loans therefore end up as part of a different transaction.
Case law resulting from the global financial crisis has provided judicial
descriptions of the key features of these complex transactions that are an
established feature of the modem financial landscape.
CDOs are
a financial structure at the centre of which a special purpose vehicle
("SPV") issues tranches of debt securities, the performance of which
is linked to a portfolio of assets. The SPV may either hold the
underlying assets (a "cash CDO") or take exposure to assets such as
corporate bonds or asset-backed securities via a credit default swap
with a financial counterparty (a "synthetic CDO"). The performance
of CDOs is linked or "referenced" to the pool of underlying bonds or
securities, the "Reference Pool."
In the case of a synthetic CDO the issuer may (as in the present case)
invest the proceeds of issue of the CDOs in a portfolio of high
quality, typically AAA-rated assets ("collateral"); those collateral
assets are used to generate income to make coupon (interest)
payments on the CDOs and, in the case of a default of any of the
Reference Pool to which the SPV is exposed, to pay the financial
counterparty the loss due under the credit default swap. On each
occasion on which one of the assets in the Reference Pool defaults or
is subject to some other "credit event" (such as a downgrading of its
credit rating), then a payment becomes due from the SPV to the
financial institution under the credit default swap. At the same time,
the principal and interest due from the SPV to the CDO noteholder is
correspondingly reduced. The usual practice is for CDO notes to be
issued in different classes, whereby the losses are allocated
sequentially commencing with the most "junior" tranche of notes
until the original principal amount of such class of notes are written
down to zero, and then losses are allocated to the next "higher"
tranche of notes, until the entire capital structure is exhausted or the
maturity date of the CDO notes occurs. As a consequence junior
notes suffer as a result of earlier Reference Pool defaults/other credit
events and the less risky "senior" tranches suffer loss only after the
underlying classes of CDO notes have been reduced to zero principal
value.
A common feature of actively managed CDOs is that one of the
parties to the transaction has the right to alter the composition of the
Reference Pool. Such a right potentially increases the risk for the
holder of the CDO note, particularly if the party with the right to alter
14. This was the cause of action in UBS Securities LLC v. HSH Nordbank AG
[2009] EWCA Civ 585.
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the composition of the Reference Pool has an economic interest in the
transaction, as in the present case.
Finally, the larger financial transactions are typically arranged on the
basis of standardised documents that are recommended by leading
industry associations such as ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc), LMA (Loan Markets Association), LSTA (Loan
Syndications and Trading Association) and the ICMA (International
Capital Markets Association). These associations consult widely with
industry practitioners and regulators, and they work in close
collaboration with the leading law firms in the world (many of whom are
members of the associations). As a result, any decision on a large
transaction will be watched closely and has the potential for global
impact because many other transactions are based on the same template
of documents.
The usual approach taken by English courts (and this is also true for
most courts in the leading financial centres) is to enforce the words of the
contract negotiated by the parties.'6 The courts hold that risk allocation
should be left to the parties, who are typically sophisticated (the clients
are sophisticated investors, borrowers or counterparties, and the financial
products are sophisticated) and are advised by competent and
experienced legal counsel. The courts' role in this regard is usually
limited to the application of the words of the contract'7 since consumer
issues do not intrude in this area.
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN THE COURTS
The courts' usual contribution to financial law is the interpretation
and application of the law such that the law develops in the same
direction as industry practices. From time to time, though, there are
occasional divergences between the court decisions and some
15. UBS AG v. HSH Nordbank AG [2009] EWCA Div 585 at [10]-[12].
16. Granted there are some differences of approach between those that adopt a literal
interpretation of the contract and those that are more willing to take into account the
context or commercial background. Recent English cases that have taken into account
the commercial object of the contract in the interpretation of contracts include Re Sigma
Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2, Re Golden Key Ltd [20091 EWCA Civ 636, Cattles plc v.
Welcome Financial Services Ltd. [2009] EWHC 3027 (Ch), and ING Bank NV v. Ros
Roca SA [2010] EWHC 50 (Comm). Those that adopted the literary approach include
Mills v. HSBC Trustee (Cl) Ltd. [2009] EWHC 3377 (Ch) and Chartbrook Ltd. v.
Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38.
17. See e.g., JP Morgan Chase v. Springwell [2008] EWHC 1186; Peekay Intermark
Ltd v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. [2006] EWCA 386; IFE Fund SA
v. Goldman Sachs International [2007] EWCA Civ 811; Raiffeisen Zentralbank
Osterreich AG v. Royal Bank of Scotland 2010 EWHC 1392 (Comm); British Energy
Power and Trading Ltd v. Credit Suisse [2008] EWCA Civ 53 (CA).
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perceptions in commercial quarters. A court decision that is out of
alignment with commercial perceptions is usually followed by debate
and refinement of the standard form documentation or corrective
legislative action and in that way contributes to the development of the
law. One such decision involved the Metavante corporation and Lehman
Brothers.
Metavante' 8
The facts of this case took place between two US business entities,
and the transaction was governed by New York law. The case
potentially has global implications, however, because it pitted US
bankruptcy law and policy against standard terms in the ISDA Master
Agreement, which is a form used globally. The Metavante decision
concerned straightforward interest rate swap transactions that were
entered into in 2007 between the Metavante corporation and Lehman
Brothers Special Financing, Inc. ("LBSF") on the basis of the 1992
ISDA Master Agreement. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) was
the credit support provider and guaranteed the obligations of LBSF.
Under the swap agreement, Metavante was the fixed-rate payer and was
required to make quarterly payments based on a fixed interest rate, while
LBSF, as the floating rate payer, was required to make quarterly
payments based on a floating rate. The payments were netted, and the
net payer was required to pay the difference on a scheduled payment
date. Under the contract the events of default included the bankruptcy of
a counterparty or its credit-support provider; 9 the right, but not the
obligation, of the non-defaulting party to designate early termination
upon the occurrence of an event of default; 20 and the right to withhold
performance upon the occurrence of an event of default that was
21
continuing.
LBHI filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code on September 15, 2008, followed three weeks later by
LBSF's bankruptcy filing on October 3, 2008. Under the ISDA Master
22Agreement,22 each bankruptcy filing was a separate and independent
event of default giving rise to Metavante's right to designate an early
termination date, and the trigger of the right to withhold performance as
18. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 et seq. (JMP) (jointly
administered). The narrative of facts in the text draws heavily from Andrea Pincus, supra
note 7.
19. See ISDA Master Agreement §5(a)(viii).
20. See id. § 6(a).
21. See id § 2(a)(iii)
22. See id. § 5(a)(vii).
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long as an event of default was continuing.23 It was common ground that
an early termination would have yielded a multi-million dollar payment
to LBSF and that the scheduled payments were substantially in favour of
LBSF. Metavante did not designate an early termination of the
agreement and instead chose to withhold payment under the individual
transactions that remained outstanding.
In May 2009, Lehman Brothers (the debtor and defaulting party)
moved to compel performance by Metavante (the non-defaulting party)
and claimed payment of all past-due amounts plus default interest.
Lehman Brothers essentially based its arguments on US bankruptcy law
and policy. First, it argued that while the Bankruptcy Code respected the
contractual rights of the non-defaulting party to terminate, accelerate or
liquidate its positions in derivatives contracts and net payments, such
rights inhered only if the contract was terminated. Second, it was against
the legislative intent of the Bankruptcy Code for Metavante to rely on
section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement and choose to keep the
contract on foot rather than to promptly terminate it after default. The
legislative intention favoured prompt termination so as to permit markets
to continue functioning in the direct aftermath of a major player's
collapse. Third, section 2(a)(iii) was an unenforceable ipso facto clause
in contravention of the Bankruptcy Code.2 4 It was claimed that
"Metavante effectively modified the parties' contract rights by permitting
indefinite suspension of performance obligations only because of the
financial condition of the debtors and commencement of the bankruptcy
cases."
Metavante, on the other hand, relied on the ISDA Master
Agreement and argued that it had the right, but not the obligation, to
terminate outstanding transactions and that there was no time limit for
making the choice. Secondly, it argued that section 2(a)(iii) "expressly
permitted the non-defaulting party to suspend its performance while an
event of default was continuing, again with no contractual time limit and
no exception for a bankruptcy event of default." Thirdly, Metavante
argued that "the US Bankruptcy Code ... expressly excepts from the
ipso facto clause prohibition positions under a swap or master netting
agreement, and does so without imposing any statutory time limit." The
key provisions governing payment and delivery of obligations which the
court had to apply were the following.
Section 2(a)(i) of the ISDA Master Agreement states:
23. See id § 2(a)(iii).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2005).
[Vol. 29:3562
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Each party will make each payment or delivery specified in each
Confirmation to be made by it, subject to the other provisions of this
Agreement.
Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement states:
Each obligation of each party under Section 2(a)(i) is subject to
(1) the condition precedent that no Event of Default or Potential
Event of Default with respect to the other party has occurred and is
continuing, (2) the condition precedent that no Early Termination
Date in respect of the relevant Transaction has occurred or been
effectively designated and (3) each other applicable condition
precedent specified in this Agreement.
In a bench ruling,2 5 the court held in favour of the defaulting party
(Lehman Brothers) and against the non-defaulting party (Metavante). In
a nutshell, the court decided that under United States law a non-
defaulting party must make a choice to terminate or not terminate the
contract, and the party has a limited time within which to make that
choice. But this does not tally with the express wording of the ISDA
Master Agreement. The court expressly limited the "enforceability of
section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement and the scope of the US
Bankruptcy Code protections for non-defaulting parties to derivative
contracts." The court ruled that, first, each of the respective bankruptcy
filings of LBHI and LBSF constituted a separate event of default that
triggered Metavante's right to terminate the transaction. Secondly, the
safe-harbour provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code apply only to protect
a non-defaulting swap counterparty's contractual rights solely to
liquidate, terminate or accelerate derivative contracts upon the
bankruptcy of a counterparty or to offset or net out any termination
values or payment amounts or foreclose on collateral. The provisions do
not apply where the non-defaulting party fails to terminate, liquidate or
accelerate the swap, and they "do not permit the withholding of
performance under a swap if the swap is not terminated." The court
explained that
the exceptions to the unenforceability of an ipso facto clause-in this
case for executory contracts that are swaps-do not extend to the
contractual right to withhold performance under section 2(a)(iii)
where such indefinite delay of performance is triggered because of
the financial condition of the debtors. Suspension of payments, as
25. There are reports that the court had previously encouraged the litigants to settle
their dispute, and the judge was "visibly displeased" by the lack of effort on the part of
Metavante to settle the dispute: see Pincus, supra note 7.
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opposed to termination, thus amounts to a prohibited modification of
the parties' rights and obligations under the contract.
Lastly, even though there was no contractual or statutory time limit
on the right to terminate derivative transactions because of a bankruptcy
default, Metavante's window of opportunity to act promptly under the
safe-harbour provisions had passed, and it waived its right to terminate
the transactions when it waited more than eleven months after the
debtor's bankruptcy filings before seeking to terminate. The court
therefore ordered Metavante to pay the amounts withheld together with
default interest in spite of the ISDA section 2(a)(iii), which permitted
such withholding in the face of the continuing default by LBSF and
LBHI.
There were a couple of unique facts in the Metavante decision that
might have swayed the court's decision against the non-defaulting party.
First, Metavante chose to maximise its own benefits from the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers by failing to net payments, which would have
resulted in Metavante's making substantial payments to Lehman
Brothers. Secondly, Metavante chose to ride out the crisis by delaying
its decision for some eleven months when the usual commercial
expectation was to do it promptly. In this light, the court's decision was
understandable because the court said, in essence, that there was a limit
on the extent to which a non-defaulting party could shield behind the
literal reading of the ISDA provisions and other transaction documents.
One can pick quite a few areas where the court's reasoning is not
entirely satisfactory.2 6  First, for purposes of applying the ipso facto
clause, the decision did not make a distinction between the default of the
credit support provider (LBHI) and that of the debtor (LBSF), even
though there was a time gap between the two. If that distinction were
made, one could cogently argue that the trigger for Metavante's right to
modify contractual rights under ISDA section 2(a)(iii) occurred on the
earlier bankruptcy and not on the onset of the debtor's bankruptcy. 27
Secondly, the court did not give clear guidance on how long was too long
to wait before a non-defaulting party lost its right to terminate
transactions or net payments, or before it would be deemed to have
waived its right to terminate. Even though a specific time limit would
not have been helpful in light of the variety and complexity of the
transactions for which the ISDA Master Agreement is used, the court
would have been more helpful had it created a general "reasonable time"
26. See Pincus, supra note 7.
27. It was only in Lehman Bros. v. BNY that the court clarified that the Lehman
Brothers companies were to be seen as one corporate family. In Metavante the court saw
them as different corporations.
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standard or held that there was an implied term in every such contract
28
that the non-defaulting party would act within a reasonable time.
While such a standard is fluid, it is helpful enough in common-law
jurisdictions where courts and parties know how to apply it. It would
require the parties and the courts to weigh the relevant factors in each
particular transaction such as the volume, complexity, and
interconnectedness of the transactions covered by the ISDA Master
Agreement; the challenges in obtaining replacement trades from
qualified counterparties; and the difficulty of the issues involved in
restructuring an entire portfolio of an insolvent counterparty. 2 9
Arguably, the most noteworthy and controversial aspect of
Metavante-one with potentially a global reach-was the limit on the
enforceability of Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. In
refusing to enforce the section in accordance with its terms, the court
surprised prevailing orthodoxy, and initial reaction in the media was to
say that it was unsafe to do business in the United States. A literal
reading of the section appears to suggest that it is open-ended and that it
entitles the non-defaulting party to do nothing other than terminate the
transactions and crystallise the obligation. The Metavante court ruled
that in the circumstances of the case, the section did not mean what it
said on its face and that the non-defaulting party did not have the choice
simply to do nothing indefinitely. The non-defaulting party should have
fairly promptly elected to terminate the transactions; having failed to do
so, the non-defaulting party was not permitted to terminate or suspend
payments until the debtor elected to accept or reject the swap in question.
As has been observed, Metavante revealed a loophole in the section in
that the non-defaulting party can withhold payments indefinitely. The
issue is whether the loophole was closed the right way when the court
ruled that the section was unenforceable.3 0
Comparing Metavante with other global authorities, Metavante
conflicts with Enron Australia v. TXU Electricity3 1 on the right to
suspend payments under section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master
Agreement. 3 2 Enron Australia is generally taken to confirm the non-
defaulting party's right to withhold payments and the general
28. For an argument in favour of an implied term for acting within a reasonable
time, see Mark Daley, Defining the Limits ofs2(a)(iii)-Resolving the Section's Indefinite
Applicability, 24(11) BUTrERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L 647 (2009).
29. See Pincus, supra note 7.
30. See Daley, supra note 28; see Wilbur F. Forster, Jr., et al., Court Explores
Termination Rights Under Bankruptcy Code Section 560, PRATr'S J. BANKR. L. 505
(2009).
31. Enron Austl. v. TXU Elec. [2003] NSWSC 1169, affirmed as Sims v. TXU Elec.
Ltd. [2005] NSWCA 12.
32. See Pincus, supra note 7, at 5.
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enforceability of the section. The court also upheld the contractual right
not to designate an early termination to the contract.3 3 There are some
crucial factual differences between the two cases, though. In Enron
Australia, the parties agreed and the court assumed that the ISDA
provisions meant what they said-especially that Section 2(a)(iii) was
enforceable and that the section did not operate indefinitely. 34 There
were also, however, factors that make a case for similar decisions
between the two cases. In Enron Australia, the non-defaulting party was
also a net payer and therefore had a similar economic interest to that in
Metavante not to terminate the arrangement. In fact, the period for
suspending payment was also much longer, stretching from 2001 to
2005, and still it was assumed all around that the section meant what it
said.
Metavante is also hard to reconcile with the English case of Marine
Trade SA v. Pioneer Freight Futures Co. Ltd.," where the enforceability
of Section 2(a)(iii) was not in issue and was assumed. In Marine Trade
the plaintiff relied on the section for purposes of netting payments and
recovery by way of restitution for payments made under protest. Like in
Metavante, the net payments were in favour of the defaulting party, and
it was argued that it would be absurd and commercially unreasonable for
the defaulting party to keep making gross payments when in fact the
defaulting party was owed money after netting all the obligations
between the parties. Yet the court observed that this "commercial sense"
was not sufficient to gainsay the clear meaning of the contract when the
contract was not so unreasonable commercially that the court should
override it.36 The court noted that the non-defaulting party was perfectly
entitled not to elect for early termination and at the same time to insist on
gross payment by the defaulting party without any time limit.
On this account, the Metavante decision is in the minority. But this
does not necessarily mean that Metavante is wrong. On balance, the
decision was too drastic to declare the contract unenforceable. On the
other hand, commentators agree it would not make commercial sense for
the non-defaulting party's right to withhold payment to be available
33. See also Colin Riegels and Russell Willings, Metavante and ISDA Master
Agreement: BVI Perspective, (Oct. 28, 2009) INT'L L. OFFICE, http://www.international
lawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g-880dcedO-2944-4fde-adOd-8b9feed78a35.
34. See also Daley, supra note 28.
35. Marine Trade SA v. Pioneer Freight Futures Co. Ltd. BVI [2009] EWHC 2656
(Comm).
36. The court applied the dictum in Schuler v Wickman Mach. Tools [1974] A.C.
235, 251.
37. See also Russell Willings, Derivatives and Insolvency: a British Virgin Islands
Perspective on the Metavante Decision and the ISDA Master Agreement 3(1) CORP.
REscuE& INSOLVENCY J. 18 (2010).
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indefinitely.38 There needs to be a limit on how long a non-defaulting
party can withhold payments, and the Metavante decision did not clarify
how long is too long. In the instant case the court thought that eleven
months was too long, and yet in Enron Australia the parties and the court
did not see any difficulty with four years. Clearly, a rigid timetable is
not the answer, and the solution might lie in the adoption of the concept
of "reasonable time," the determination of which would depend on the
particular transaction under consideration.
Lehman Brothers-UK Litigation
The next two cases were based on the same facts and are
summarised by the following diagram.
38. See Schuyler Henderson, Master Agreements, Bridges, and Delays in
Enforcement, Part 3, 20(1) BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 18 (2005).
39. The application of the "reasonable time" concept would be similar to that found
in the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits. See Daley, supra note
28.
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The Perpetual Trustees/Lehman Brothers Litigation
In Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services
Ltd.,40 an investor sued the collateral trustee to enforce the contract terms
that gave the investor priority to the collateral following the default of
the swap counterparty. The Lehman Brothers companies (Lehman
Brothers International Europe or "LBIE") had set up a special purpose
vehicle ("SPV") that issued notes to investors in the form of synthetic
collateralised debt obligations. The subscription money obtained from




investors was used by the SPV to purchase the collateral for the notes.
The SPV in turn entered into a credit default swap with Lehman Brothers
Special Financing ("LBSF") (the swap counterparty) under which the
swap counterparty paid regular amounts to the SPV so that the SPV
could service the payments to the noteholders; in exchange, the swap
counterparty was rewarded with sums equal to the yield on the collateral.
The collateral was charged by the SPV in favour of a trust company to
secure the SPV's obligations to its creditors, who included the
noteholders and the swap counterparty. The trust deed provided that the
rights of the swap counterparty to payments and the collateral would
ordinarily have priority over payments to the noteholders, but that the
priority would change in favour of the noteholders on the occurrence of
an insolvency event by the swap counterparty or credit-support
provider.4 1  The swap agreement was subject to the ISDA Master
Agreement, and all the transactions were governed by English law.
On September 15, 2008, LBHI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in the United States. That act constituted an event of default
under the swap documentation because LBHI was designated as a credit
support provider of LBSF. On October 3, 2008, LBSF also filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, which also constituted an event of
default and triggered a priority switch from the swap counterparty to the
noteholders as to entitlement to collateral. The noteholders were not
paid, and they gave notice to the trustee to terminate their arrangement
and required the trustee to enforce the security. The swap counterparty
(LBSF) challenged the noteholders' claim to priority, arguing that it
would fall foul of the anti-deprivation rule.42 The trial judge held43 that
the disadvantage suffered by LBSF did not come within the rule and that
the provisions changing priority to collateral were operated before LBSF
filed for bankruptcy protection. The Court of Appeal unanimously
dismissed LBSF's appeal by first asking if there had been a deprivation
of property and by second asking about the timing of the deprivation. It
held that the "flip" of priority from the swap counterparty to the
41. This is the so-called "waterfall flip."
42. While the scope and preciseness of the anti-deprivation rule is subject to debate,
the courts agree that the modem rule is based on public policy and says that one cannot
contract out of the insolvency regime. See Perpetual, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1160, citing
British Eagle Int'l Air Lines v. CompagnieNationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758, per
Cross LJ (HL); Carreras Rothmans Ltd. v. Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd. [1985] 1 Ch
207, per Gibson J; and Int'l Air Trans.Ass'n v. .Ansett Austl. [2008] BPIR 57 (HC). The
rule was stated by Cotton LJ in Ex parte Jay that "there cannot be a valid contract that a
man's property shall remain his until his bankruptcy, and on the happening of that event
shall go over to someone else, and be taken away from his creditors." Ex parte Jay; In re
Harrison (1880) 14 Ch D 19 at 26, see also Money Markets Int'l Stockbrokers v. London
Stock Exch.[2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150 (Ch D).
43. See Perpetual, EWCA (Civ)1160.
2011] 569
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
noteholders was not a divesture or transfer of property to the noteholders
but merely a change in the order of priorities in which rights were to be
exercised in relation to the proceeds of the sale of collateral in the event
of default. Furthermore, the court reasoned that it was an agreed feature
of the contract documents from inception that the priority right enjoyed
by LBSF over collateral was contingent on there being no event of
default; the priority right was therefore lost in favour of the noteholders
on the occurrence of default. In addition, the court noted that the anti-
deprivation rule might not apply where, as in the instant case, the person
for whose benefit the deprivation took effect could show that the asset, or
the insolvent's interest in the asset, over which the deprivation took
effect was obtained by his or her own money." Lord Justice Patten took
the simple view that the "flip" was an original feature of the contract and
could not possibly be seen as a deprivation of property at the onset of the
counterparty's bankruptcy.45 Secondly, the court held that the switch or
"flip" from counterparty to noteholder priority did not violate the anti-
deprivation rule because it occurred before, not on or after, liquidation
since the alteration of priority was triggered when LBHI filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was some eighteen days earlier than when
LBSF (the credit support provider) filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11.46 A deprivation did not fall within the scope of the rule if it occurred
before winding up or its equivalent.
As a matter of policy, English courts emphasise the principle of
party autonomy. In the High Court, the Chancellor observed that courts
should enforce the parties' agreement rather than enforce the anti-
deprivation rule on them. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Neuberger M.R.
made clear that that in "complex and sophisticated contractual
arrangements the parties should be expected to know what they were
doing, and the courts should be slow to take away their right to freely
contract on terms as they see fit."A7 As the Master of Rolls pointed out:
It is important that, so far as possible, judicial decisions in the
insolvency field ensure that the law is clear and consistent. That has
always been true, but the need for consistency and clarity is all the
greater now that commercial contracts are becoming increasingly
complex both in their underlying nature and in their detailed
44. See Whitmore v. Mason (1861) 70 Eng. Rep. 1031.
45. See Perpetual, EWCA (Civ) at 1160.
46. The court and litigants agreed that the filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy was
equivalent to making a winding-up order under English law.
47. See Christopher Harlowe, Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee
Services Ltd-the anti-deprivation principle-whose rights are they anyway? 21(3)
ENTM'T L. REv. 114, 114-115 (2010). It is important to note that the anti-deprivation
principle was only reigned in and not thrown out altogether.
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provisions, as is well demonstrated by the contracts in the instant
cases.... It is also desirable that, if possible, the courts give effect to
contractual terms which the parties have agreed. Indeed, there is a
particularly strong case for party autonomy in cases of complex
financial instruments ... and in arrangements involving large
corporate groups .. .; in such cases, the parties are likely to have been
commercially sophisticated and expertly advised.48
Lehman Brothers-US Litigation
In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. BN'Y Corporate Trustee
Services Ltd. , the facts were exactly the same as those in the English
counterpart of this case (Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Trustee
Services Ltd, above) and the swap counterparty, i.e., the debtor, initiated
court action in the United States to compel the trustee to disregard the
contract documents. The swap counterparty argued that the contractual
provisions which required the modification of the scheme for payment
priority were unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the US Bankruptcy
code because they inappropriately modified the debtor's interest in a
contract solely because of a bankruptcy filing.50 The debtor also argued
that any attempt to modify the payment priority would violate the
automatic-stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code5 because it would
improperly mark an exercise of control over the property of the debtor's
estate. Finally it argued that so-called safe-harbour provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code did not protect the purported modification of payment
priority. BNY defended by arguing that the documents were governed
by English law and were to be construed in accordance with English law
and, under the principles of res judicata and comity therefore, the New
York court should defer to the determination of the issues by the English
courts. BNY also argued that LBSF could not use its status as a
bankruptcy debtor to garner greater rights with respect to the collateral
than it possessed before the bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, BNY
argued that the payment modifications at issue were the agreed upon
mechanisms by which the parties' transactions were to be liquidated and
fell within the safe harbour provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Court began by justifying its application of United
States law at the expense of English law even though the latter had been
48. Per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR in Perpetual, EWCA (Civ) 1160.
49. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.v. BNY Corp. Tr. Serv. Ltd., 422 B.R 407
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
50. Reliance was put onUS Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(B)
(2005).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2005).
2011] 571
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
explicitly chosen by the parties as the governing law of the contract
documents. The court noted that it was not obliged to recognise a
judgment rendered by a foreign court but that it could give res judicata
effect on the basis of comity. It then observed that the English courts
had not taken account of the principles of US bankruptcy law in the
earlier proceedings that the trustee wanted enforced. It held that as a
general matter "courts will not extend comity to foreign proceedings
when doing so would be contrary to policies or prejudicial to the interests
of the United States."52 While recognising that the application of the
Bankruptcy Code would yield an outcome directly at odds with the
judgment of the English courts, the court articulated the guiding policy:
Despite the resulting cross-border conflict, the United States has a
strong interest in having a United States bankruptcy court resolve
issues of bankruptcy law, particularly in a circumstance such as this
where the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provide greater
protections than are available under applicable provisions of foreign
law.53
The court therefore decided not to give "preclusive effect" to the English
judgments and proceeded to apply the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. The bankruptcy court reached different factual and legal
conclusions than the English court and applied different law. Key among
the differences were these: First, the court held that the priority accorded
by the transaction documents to LBSF was a valuable property interest
that was entitled to protection as part of the bankruptcy estate. The
contract documents that changed priority from LBSF to the noteholders
was a modification of that valuable right.54 Second, the court viewed the
Lehman Brothers holding company and the multiple subsidiaries within
the corporate group as one integrated enterprise such that the first filing
for bankruptcy on September 15 by LBHI was the event that precipitated
subsequent related events. The court then noted that the Bankruptcy
Code's policy against ipso facto clauses prohibits the modification of a
debtor's right solely because of an agreement conditioned upon the
commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Code55 and was not
limited to the commencement of a case by or against the debtor.56 In the
instant litigation, "a case" was commenced by a related entity when
LBHI, the corporate parent and credit-support provider, filed for
52. Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. (In re Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
53. Id.
54. In this regard US law, which requires "modification," is different from UK law,
which requires "deprivation."
55. 11 U.S.C. §§ 356(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) (2005).
56. Emphasis in original text.
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bankruptcy. The court therefore held that the transaction documents
which sought to modify the right to priority of collateral (the "flip") after
the first filing constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause. Similarly,
such provisions violated the automatic stay, which was triggered on the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, because they sought to deprive the
debtor and its creditors of valuable property.
The bankruptcy court's decision stands as the law of the United
States.57 However, there are some internal weaknesses. First, disregard
for the choice-of-law provisions and the reasons given for doing so are
not convincing. Commercial parties of the level of sophistication that
was involved in the Lehman Brothers litigation give careful
consideration to choice-of-law and choice-of-jurisdiction matters and
address the prospect of insolvency when they make their choice. The
very purpose of choosing a particular well known system, such as
English law, is to avoid the surprise that may be sprung upon parties by
other systems of law, particularly those they know and deliberately
avoid, such as the law of New York. The judge seemed to appreciate
that the law he applied was different than what the parties envisaged
when they entered into contract. He said:
[T]he English Courts have been most gracious in allowing room for
this Court to express itself independently on matters of importance to
the administration of the LBHI and LBSF bankruptcy cases. In
applying the Bankruptcy Code to these facts the Court recognizes that
it is interpreting applicable law in a manner that will yield an
outcome directly at odds with the judgment of the English Courts.
Secondly, the bankruptcy court based itself exclusively on US
policy in a situation when another jurisdiction was clearly more
relevant-the assets that were the subject of contention were located in
England. It is a common occurrence in the practice of large financial
transactions that a number of entities from multiple jurisdictions will be
involved either as lenders, investors, debtors, guarantors, security
trustees, custodians, etc., and the contracting parties allocate their legal
risks by choice-of-law provisions. The multi-jurisdictional nature of
such transactions forces the parties to decide where they want to litigate
and under which system of law; courts should facilitate the transactions
by respecting the parties' choices. While there is no doubt that US
bankruptcy law and policy are important, the parties contracted to be
governed by a different bankruptcy regime-the English law bankruptcy
regime-and must be taken to have known that the two regimes have
57. An appeal is pending.
58. See Clifford Chance, Client Briefing, Anti-deprivation: What next for the UK
Structured Debt Market? (2010).
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different areas of emphasis. A court that disregards the scheme of
allocating risks chosen by industry practitioners fails to appreciate the
importance of choice-of-law provisions in structured finance.
Thirdly, the court made no attempt to balance domestic policy with
the needs of international business or finance. In commercial contracts
involving sophisticated businesses, the parties are normally held to their
contracts and cannot be seen to contest the documents they signed. The
documents create a contractual estoppel whereby the parties are
precluded from denying that the obligations they entered into are
binding. 59 This is especially so because a leading player, such as
Lehman Brothers, was at the forefront of creating and marketing such
financial instruments and could not reasonably say that it did not know
what it was doing. The court acknowledged the weakness in its approach
in a footnote: "The Court recognizes that there is an element of
commercial expectation that underlies the subordination argument.
LBSF was instrumental in the development and marketing of the
complex financial structures that are now being reviewed from a
bankruptcy perspective."60
From a broader perspective, the decision declared as unenforceable
provisions that are common in structured finance transactions where
payments to a swap counterparty are subordinated if the counterparty has
defaulted on its obligations. While this might instinctively be seen as a
disadvantage to doing business in the United States generally or where
the swap counterparty is subject to the US Bankruptcy Code, and while
this might at first blush be seen as detracting from the enforceability of
subordination provisions generally, it is thought that the impact of the
decision might not be widespread and that the decision might be limited
to the facts of this case. 6 ' Furthermore, English law does not have a
principle of substantive consolidation that was relied upon by the
Bankruptcy Court to treat LBHI and LBSF as the same; the US decision
is therefore unlikely to have impact in the UK.62
59. See Peekay Intermark Ltd v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.
[2006] EWCA 386; RaiffeisenZentralbankOsterreich AG v. Royal Bank of Scotland
[2010] EWHC (Comm) 1392.
60. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Serv. Ltd., 422 B.R 407,
422 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
61. See Mark Ellenberg and Nick Shiren, The Enforceability of Structured Finance
Subordination Provisions: where to next? 5 J.I.B.F.L 284 (2010).
62. See Clifford Chance, Client Briefing, Anti-deprivation: What next for the UK




The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 illustrated graphically that
in the era of globalisation business will cross geographical boundaries-
and so will litigation. The crisis also provided fertile ground for
litigation that has expanded and clarified the boundaries of existing
financial law. It was not surprising in this plethora of court cases that
some conflicting decisions were reached in different jurisdictions or that
long-standing perceptions were tested.
Whatever the merits or demerits of Metavante, the decision is the
law of the United States and must be taken into account by parties
wishing to transact business in that country. The decision potentially has
impact beyond the United States because it may influence the views of
other courts when they interpret the ISDA Master Agreement section
2(a)(iii). In any event, all parties that enter into transactions that are
governed by the ISDA Master Agreement must take the decision into
account when they decide whether or not to terminate a transaction
following the insolvency of a counterparty.6 3 The initial impact was that
the decision caused uncertainty in derivatives transactions, especially
where US counterparties were involved in transactions that adopted the
ISDA Master Agreement. Subsequently the Metavante decision was
appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, and subsequently the Lehman Brothers debtors sought court
approval for a settlement deal with Metavante. It has been noted that if
the settlement is approved, it would likely forestall a binding
precedential judgment by the courts.6
English courts have traditionally tried to avoid conflicting decisions
with their overseas counterparts, particularly in commercial matters.
This was exemplified by Coleman, J. in Lordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of
Zambia, in the course of considering a provision concerning default
interest rate in a loan agreement:
It would be highly regrettable if the English courts were to refuse to
give effect to such prevalent provisions while the courts of New York
are prepared to enforce them. For there to be a disparity between the
63. Briefing, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, US Bankruptcy Court Finds That
Payment Conditionality is Unenforceable Under Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master
Agreement (2009).
64. Ken Coleman, Daniel Guyder & John Williams, Allen & Overy, Lehman Moves
for Bankruptcy Court Approval of Metavante Settlement (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?contentTypelD=1 &item
ID=55295&prefLanglD=410 (While the settlement would not be binding on other
parties, it would provide guidance to those similarly situated in relation to the Lehman
debtors).
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law applicable in London and New York on this point would be of
great disservice to international banking.65
It is sometimes inevitable, however, that the law of one country
clashes with the principles of another jurisdiction. A case in point is the
earlier insolvency case of Bank of Credit and Commerce International,66
when English law and practice on set-off brushed against the legal
principles of other jurisdictions. In that earlier case, English authorities
were able to cooperate with other jurisdictions to obtain a satisfactory
practical result. Similarly in the US Lehman Brothers case (In re
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v BNY Corporate Trustee Services
Ltd67), the court was keenly aware that its application of United States
law was in direct conflict with the earlier English decision based on the
same facts. The court called for a status conference to sort out the
difficulties that confronted the parties in the face of a fragmented legal
world. The court said:
[T]he Court anticipates that the current ruling may be a controversial
one, especially due to the resulting conflict with the decisions of the
English Courts. . .. This is a situation that calls for the parties, this
Court and the English Courts to work in a coordinated and
cooperative way to identify means to reconcile the conflicting
judgments. The Court directs that the parties attend a status
conference to be held on the next available omnibus hearing date in
the Debtor's cases for purposes of exploring means to harmonise the
decisions of this Court and the English Courts.68
The idea of the status conference is appealing, but the power of a
court to compel parties to attend or to sanction a non-cooperative party is
not so clear.
It bears emphasis that the two conflicting UK and US court
decisions that left the trustee caught in the middle of a Trans-Atlantic
storm were based on different laws and policy. The anti-deprivation
principle in English law focuses on depriving the bankruptcy estate of
property while the US ipso facto clause focuses on the modification of
contractual relationships. The English insolvency regime is largely pro-
creditor and ordinarily upholds commercial contracts, while the US
bankruptcy court applied a statute that is largely pro-debtor. English law
65. Lordsvale Finance plc v. Bank of Zambia [1996] 3 All ER 156; Similar
sentiments have been known to exist in the United States as well, see AON Financial
Products, Inc v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007), above.
66. Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 9) [1994] 3 All ER 764.
67. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.,
422 B.R 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
68. Id. at 423.
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emphasises party autonomy, particularly in complex transactions
involving sophisticated parties, while bankruptcy law is pre-eminent in
the US. The US court applied the principle of substantive consolidation
and considered all the Lehman Brothers companies as one group, while
English law did not apply such a concept. The English decision was
consistent with the ISDA Master Agreement and was therefore
welcomed by most commercial entities (invariably not all of them),
while the US decision caused consternation in some commercial quarters
because it challenged widely held perceptions. It is thought unlikely that
US principles would be applied in the UK.
It is not a novel occurrence that a court decision challenges the
wisdom of established law and practice as contained in the documents
generated in practice. Examples abound stretching back to the early days
of the promissory note and the decisions of Chief Justice Holt69 to more
recent cases involving set off and netting70 and swaps and derivatives.
Legal practitioners understand very well that there is always a risk that a
document or provision may be declared unenforceable by the courts.
This is exactly what is known as documentation risk, a constituent
72
element of legal risk, which is the mainstay of a lawyer's practice.
Practitioners address legal risk in overseas jurisdictions by obtaining
legal opinions and routinely advise clients that they cannot be absolutely
sure what the courts will do in fact.
A direct clash of court decisions is not necessarily a bad thing. In
the history of commercial practice, every setback by the courts has
provided an opportunity for further debate and has led to further
development of the law and practice.73  In the short term, legal
practitioners may be confused about how to advise clients, but in the
long term such clashes lead to debate and further analysis leading to the
69. Commercial law folklore teaches that Chief Justice Holt was hostile to the
development of promissory notes and had to be overruled by parliament before the
instruments were allowed to develop as a very useful facility for trade.
70. See British Eagle International Airlines v. Compagnie Nationale Air France
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 75.
71. See Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1.
72. See ROGER MCCORMICK, LEGAL RiSK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (Oxford
University Press 2006).
73. More recent examples include the two Elliott Associates cases and Aon. Elliott
Assocs, LP General Docket No 2000/) R/92 (Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8 'h Chamber,
26 September 2000) reached an unusual interpretation of the pari passu clause and the
court action was initiated in Brussels because it was clear that the New York courts
would not agree to that interpretation; see also Elliott Assoc, LP v. Banco de la Nacion
2000 WL 1449862 (SDNY, 29 September 2000). Following the unusual decision in
Brussels, the LMA (industry group in Europe) initiated a discussion group to see the
implication of the 'new' interpretation; see A MUGASHA, THE LAW OF MULTI-BANK
FINANCING: SYNDICATED LOANS AND THE SECONDARY LOAN MARKET 234-234 (Oxford
University Press 2007).
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development of law and practice. Following significant decisions,
standard form contracts are typically updated, new legal opinions issued,
and even corrective legislation may follow. It is very clear, therefore,
that the courts do influence practice greatly, and any significant decision,
however divergent, contributes to the development of the law. 74 It is also
clear that industry opinions and commercial practice do influence the
law, and in that regard there is a healthy reflexive relationship between
the courts and legal practice.
The court decisions discussed in this article illustrate an important
aspect of the development of commercial law in the present era. Many
financial centres are contributing to the law because of the integration of
the global financial market. The majority of the most complex
transactions take place in Europe and are particularly centred in London
on the one hand, and the United States and particularly in New York on
the other hand. There are many nodes in the different geographical
regions of the financial market, but the current leadership of the law and
transactions is a bi-polar, trans-Atlantic affair that is backed by English
law and courts on the one hand, and New York law and courts on the
other. In this light, the cooperation between the courts, practitioners and
regulators in London and New York on important financial matters such
as the interpretation of the ISDA Master Agreement is a service to the
global financial industry. This trans-Atlantic cooperation, flagged by
chance by the US bankruptcy judge following a curious decision, may be
one of the more visible legacieS76 of the Lehman Brothers litigation and
may tum out to be the model for future lawmaking, because global
transactions and legal fragmentation are here to stay.
POSTSCRIPT
There is ongoing vibrant activity inside and outside the courts
regarding all the three key cases discussed in this essay. An appeal from
the English case of Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd is expected to be
heard in the English Supreme Court during spring 2011. The US case
was also appealed. The same litigation in the US is subject to a couple
of motions; first, by Lehman Brothers to buy the perpetual notes,n and
74. ISDA issued an opinion clarifying the law following Metavante, supra note 6.
75. See, e.g. Enron Australia, supra note 31.
76. Another important legacy may emerge from the requirements of the rating
agencies which are still developing their response to the US decision. Blamed for initial
overreaction, they presently distinguish between US and non-US entities when they rate
counterparties to swap contracts or securitisation .structures. See CLIFFORD CHANCE,
NEW HORIZONS: LEGAL AND STRUCTURING DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
STRUCTURED DEBT PRODUCTS 66-67 (London, June 2010).
77. This was the subject of a court order on April 22, 2010.
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second, by the trustee seeking declaratory judgment to resolve the
impasse between the UK and US litigation. If Lehman Brothers indeed
purchases the perpetual notes, the basis for the UK and US litigation will
be removed and the resolution of the trans-Atlantic conflict in
bankruptcy law may not take place.

